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Essay
Connecting the Rule of Recognition and Intentionalist
Interpretation: An Essay in Honor of Richard Kay
LARRY ALEXANDER
In this piece, I take up two topics that have been preeminent in the
scholarship of Richard Kay: the fundamental norm that is the foundation of legal
systems, and the proper object of the interpretation of constitutional and statutory
texts, namely, the texts’ authors’ intended meaning. My aim is to show how these
two topics are related.
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Connecting the Rule of Recognition and Intentionalist
Interpretation: An Essay in Honor of Richard Kay
LARRY ALEXANDER *
INTRODUCTION
It is an honor and a pleasure to participate in this celebration of the
career of Richard Kay. Rick and I go way back. And although we live at
opposite ends of this continental country, the distance between our views
on the topics of our mutual interest is, if it exists, microscopic. Or at least
that is how I understand Rick’s views.
The two areas of Rick’s interest and mine that I shall address are the
foundations of legal systems and legal interpretation as a quest for
lawmakers’ intended meanings. Rick has written extensively about both
topics.1 I have written extensively about the second but much less about the
first.2 What neither of us has written about explicitly, however, is what, if
*
Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. I want to thank Jim
Allan and Steve Smith for their comments, and Joe Bsaibes and Noah Gaarder-Feingold for their
excellent research assistance.
1
For Kay’s work on the foundations of legal systems, see RICHARD S. KAY, THE GLORIOUS
REVOLUTION AND THE CONTINUITY OF LAW (2014); Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J.
COMP. L. 715 (2011); Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JURIS. 31 (2000);
Richard S. Kay, William III and the Legalist Revolution, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1645 (2000); Richard S.
Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 57 (1987); Richard S. Kay,
Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981). For Kay’s work on legal and especially
constitutional interpretation, see Richard S. Kay, Construction, Originalist Interpretation and the
Complete Constitution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1 (2017); Richard S. Kay, Original Intention
and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009); Richard S. Kay,
“Originalist” Values and Constitutional Interpretation, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 335 (1996);
William B. Fisch & Richard S. Kay, The Legitimacy of the Constitutional Judge and Theories of
Interpretation in the United States, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 517 (1994); Richard S. Kay, Original
Intentions, Standard Meanings, and the Legal Character of the Constitution, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 39
(1989); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).
2
LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING chs. 5–6 (2008);
LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY RULES, PRINCIPLES, AND
THE DILEMMAS OF LAW ch. 5 (2001); Larry Alexander, Goldsworthy on Interpretation of Statutes and
Constitutions: Public Meaning, Intended Meaning and the Bogey of Aggregation, in LAW UNDER A
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY (Lisa Burton Crawford
et al. eds., 2019); Larry Alexander, Law and Politics: What is Their Relation?, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 355 (2019); Lawrence A. Alexander, Was Dworkin an Originalist?, in THE LEGACY OF RONALD
DWORKIN 299 (Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds., 2016); Larry Alexander, Legal Positivism and
Originalist Interpretation, 16 REVISTA ARG. DE TEORIA JURIDICA (2015); Larry Alexander, Hart and
Punishment for Negligence, in HART ON RESPONSIBILITY (Christopher G. Pulman ed., 2014); Larry
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any, is the connection between these two topics. That connection is what I
shall try to establish here.
I. KAY ON THE FOUNDATION OF LEGAL SYSTEMS
The article that first acquainted me with Rick the scholar was his 1981
piece Preconstitutional Rules,3 which appeared in a symposium issue of
the Ohio State Law Journal in which I also contributed a piece.4 In Rick’s
piece, he points out that the U.S. Constitution is the touchstone of legal
validity in the U.S. legal system only because of something more
fundamental than the Constitution–what Rick calls a “preconstitutional
rule.” Rick’s notion of a preconstitutional rule is, as Rick acknowledges,5
equivalent to what H. L. A. Hart called a “rule of recognition”6 in The
Concept of Law.7
Rick points out that constitutional decisions can be criticized as
inconsistent with the preconstitutional rule. A decision that misinterprets
the Constitution but does not question the preconstitutional rule that
establishes the Constitution as fundamental law is obviously criticizable as
legally erroneous.8 But one can also criticize the preconstitutional rule
itself, not on legal grounds–for it is the foundation of the legal system–but

Alexander, Constitutional Theories: A Taxonomy and (Implicit) Critique, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 623
(2014); Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (2013); Larry
Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 87 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011); Larry
Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139 (2010); Larry Alexander, Waluchow’s—Living
Tree Constitutionalism, 29 LAW & PHIL. 93 (2009); Larry Alexander, Of Living Trees and Dead
Hands: The Interpretation of Constitutions and Constitutional Rights, 22 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 227
(2009); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Rules of Recognition, Constitutional Controversies, and
the Dizzying Dependence of Law on Acceptance, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 175 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009); Larry Alexander, How to
Understand Legislatures: A Comment on Boudreau, Lupia, McCubbins, and Rodriguez, 44 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 993 (2007); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why
Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004); Larry Alexander
& Emily Sherwin, Interpreting Rules: The Nature and Limits of Inchoate Intentions, in LEGAL
INTERPRETATION IN DEMOCRATIC STATES 3 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy & Tom Campbell eds., 2002); Larry
Alexander, On Statutory Interpretation: Fancy Theories of Interpretation Aren’t, 73 WASH. U. L. Q.
1081 (1995); Larry Alexander, Originalism, or Who is Fred?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 321 (1995);
Larry Alexander, All of Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in
LAW AND INTERPRETATIONS: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995).
3
Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 1, at 187.
4
Larry A. Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and
Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3 (1981).
5
See Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 1, at 189–90 (discussing Hart’s “rule of
recognition”).
6
Id. at 100–02.
7
H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
8
Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 1, at 190.
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9

on moral or prudential grounds. Why, for example, should we be bound
by legal norms established over 200 years ago by privileged white males,
some of whom owned slaves? Why should the preconstitutional rule, the
rule of recognition, recognize their constitution as fundamental law rather
than some other possible constitution more apt for the country and world
we inhabit today?
Rick notes that there are also two non-evaluative questions we can ask
about the preconstitutional rule. We can ask what is the preconstitutional
rule–what does it prescribe (its content)–and we can ask whose say so
determines what it is.10 Rick takes as a given in the article that the answer
to the latter question is that it is the Supreme Court’s understanding of the
preconstitutional rule that counts.11 In this respect, Rick is following Hart,
who argued that the rule of recognition is established by its acceptance as
such by officials.12
Here I want to pause. There is an obvious bootstrap quality in Hart’s
claim that rules of recognition are established by virtue of their acceptance
by officials. For what makes officials official? Being an official is not
something bestowed by nature, like being female or being over six feet tall.
One is an official because one meets criteria established by law. But the
law that makes one an official is law because it is valid within a legal
system, which in turn rests on a rule of recognition, which in turn,
according to Hart, exists because of acceptance by officials.13 In other
words, one is an official by virtue of accepting the system that makes one
an official. Nice work if you can get it.
Obviously, then, there has to be more than official acceptance to
establish a rule of recognition. Alfred’s accepting a rule of recognition that
recognizes as a legal norm “Alfred is an official” will not by itself make
Alfred’s rule of recognition the rule of recognition. There has to be
something else.
For Hart, that something else was efficacy.14 That is, the people in
whose society the rule of recognition exists must generally comply with
the laws validated by that rule of recognition. Of course, people comply
with law to varying degrees and for all sorts of reasons. And they may
comply without accepting as valid the laws the officials’ rule of
recognition validates. Indeed, on the Hartian model, which Rick accepts,
there may be more than one legal system purporting to govern a society.
9

Id.
See id.
11
See id. at 190–91.
12
HART, supra note 7, at 113.
13
See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 2, at 178–79. See also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW
AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 107–09 (2018).
14
HART, supra note 7, at 113.
10
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French citizens in World War II may have divided over whether the laws
of the Vichy government or the laws of the Free French government in
exile should be obeyed when they conflicted.15 And if they divided over
which laws to accept as valid, they perforce divided over who were really
“officials.”16
So, if, as Hart believed and as Rick and I believe, the content of the
rule of recognition is an empirical question, it is a complex, messy,
difficult empirical question. It will be a function, not just of the attitudes of
a discrete group of officials, who are only officials because of their
attitudes, but of the attitudes and beliefs of a much wider population. As I
have said elsewhere, determining the content of the rule of recognition is
perhaps the most difficult jurisprudential question for jurisprudes.17
One consequence of the possibility of competing rules of recognition
and thus competing legal systems within a single society is of relevance to
us Americans today. Matthew Adler has pointed out that because legal
actors from the Supreme Court Justices on down disagree about what
makes a constitutional decision correct—what are the “truthmakers” of
constitutional decisions—such a fundamental disagreement seems to entail
that we lack a unified legal system and in a real sense lack law. Adler asks,
“What would it take for one side in this debate to be [legally] correct and
the other [legally] incorrect? How is that even possible given the very fact
of debate?”18
I shall come back to Adler’s question later when I turn to Rick’s
account of proper constitutional interpretation. For there is a link between
the methodologies of constitutional interpretation and the content of the
rule of recognition.
Kay goes on to point out several interesting aspects of
preconstitutional rules. He distinguishes arguments that assume a certain
such rule and thus that count as legal arguments from arguments about the
desirability of this or that preconstitutional rule. The latter arguments
cannot be legal arguments because what is legal depends upon the
acceptance of a given preconstitutional rule.19 Kay also distinguishes
“closed” and “open” preconstitutional rules. The latter leave open certain
15

René Cassin, Vichy or Free France?, 20 FOREIGN AFF. 102, 107–08 (1941).
See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 2, at 178 n.16.
17
See Alexander, Constitutional Theories, supra note 2, at 641–43. See also Alexander &
Schauer, supra note 2, at 186–87.
18
Matthew D. Adler, Interpretive Contestation and Legal Correctness, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1115, 1136 (2012). See also Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition:
Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 804–05 (2006). If we restrict ourselves
to officialism, the answer to Adler’s question is that officials accept that whatever the Supreme Court
decides is constitutional law is constitutional law. See Alexander, Who is Fred, supra note 2, at 326
n.17. Until the Court decides, however, there is no shared constitutional law. See also Alexander &
Schauer, supra note 2, at 184–86.
19
Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 1, at 193.
16
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issues of validity—issues that can be resolved in the future. He quotes
Marbury v. Madison21 for an illustration of reliance on a closed
preconstitutional rule, one in which the Constitution is to be understood as
its authors intended it to be understood, which he says remains orthodox
constitutional theory.22 And he contrasts this closed preconstitutional rule
with the open one, a clear manifesto of juristocracy: “Properly
promulgated government actions are valid if the Supreme Court does not
disapprove them.”23 (Query: How on such a preconstitutional rule do we
know in the absence of Supreme Court decisions what things are
“government actions,” or when they are “properly promulgated”? And is
the Supreme Court then only the Supreme Court because it tells us so?)24
The choice between a closed and an open preconstitutional rule is a choice
between fixity and flexibility; but it is also a choice between decision
makers—the authors of the Constitution or the Supreme Court.
Rick continued his discussion of preconstitutional rules in an article
published six years after Preconstitutional Rules entitled The Illegality of
the Constitution.25 In it, Rick illustrates the nature of rules of recognition
by recounting how the United States went from being governed by the
Articles of Confederation to being governed by the Constitution. The
preconstitutional rule that legitimated the Articles, and acts legitimated by
the Articles, did not validate the work of the constitutional convention and
its proposed Constitution.26 The latter would only be legitimated by a
different preconstitutional rule. And the argument for accepting a new
preconstitutional rule, one that would legitimize the Constitution, could not
be legal; for legal arguments are offered within whatever legal system the
preconstitutional rule legitimizes and cannot be deployed to support
preconstitutional rules themselves.27 The arguments for accepting a
preconstitutional rule must be extra-legal, that is political and moral.28
Ordinary legislative bodies also could not effect a change of
preconstitutional rules, as they themselves are constituted under the
existing preconstitutional rule and might have a different character and
different powers under a new preconstitutional rule.29 Ultimately, the
20

Id. at 195.
5 U.S. 137, 176–79 (1803).
22
Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 1, at 195–96. I agree with Kay that the position taken
in Marbury remains orthodox constitutional theory, and in the concluding section of this Essay I will
explain why that is so.
23
Id. at 197.
24
See Stephen E. Sachs, The Law and Morals of Interpretation, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 103, 105 (2018).
25
Kay, Illegality, supra note 1.
26
Id. at 67.
27
Id. at 70.
28
Id. at 70–77.
29
Id. at 72.
21
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ratifying conventions and popular acceptance of the new regime over time
legitimated the preconstitutional rule that recognized the Constitution as
supreme law.30
Thus, the emergence of a new preconstitutional rule is a revolution, a
change of regimes, the establishment of a new legal order.31 Rick
concludes as follows:
The main point to be learned from an examination of the
beginnings of the Constitution, is not the fitness of one or
another preconstitutional rule. On the contrary, it shows that
we cannot settle on a correct position in this regard as a
matter of law or logic. The creation of, or change in, the
preconstitutional rule will reflect the needs and values of the
time in which it is effective and will draw its legitimacy from
its conformity with those needs and values. And since that
legitimacy is always a current matter, any preconstitutional
rule is always provisional, subject to change when social and
political factors require it. The great change of 1787-89 was
obvious because it involved an alteration of both the
preconstitutional rule and formal accoutrements of that rule,
the Articles of Confederation and the institutions of
government created under it. Similar changes which leave the
formal aspects of the legal system untouched may not
command our attention in the same way but they surely
occur. It is the possibility of such changes that makes
sensible our continuing discussion about constitutional
fundamentals. In this respect we are always in a situation like
the one that confronted the founders in 1787-89.32
Rick’s conception of preconstitutional rules, the rules that legitimate
legal regimes, and thus the statues of officials within them, is that they
exist by virtue of their broad acceptance by the governed, not by virtue of
acceptance solely by officials. For, as pointed out, officials are such only
because the legal regime in question deems them to be, and their
bootstrapping acceptance of that regime cannot legitimize it in the absence
of much broader social acceptance. And when the legal regime is no longer
accepted as legitimate by enough people, then the legitimating
preconstitutional rule, the rule of recognition, no longer exists, even if it is
still accepted by officials of the old regime. In such circumstances, the
society has entered a revolutionary period, one in which the content of the

30

Id. at 72–73. See id. at 77–79; Alexander and Schauer, supra note 2, at 180–81.
Kay, Illegality, supra note 1, at 61.
32
Id. at 80 (footnote omitted).
31
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preconstitutional rule is now up for grabs, and in which it is possible that
different legal regimes will purport to govern the same society.
Rick calls the authority of constitution makers that is derived from a
preconstitutional rule accepted by the people “constituent authority.”33 He
has written a lot about constituent authority, distinguishing constitutions
that were effectively created legally, that is, under the rules of a legal
regime that continued to exist but no longer governed the polity under the
new constitution, from constitutions that were the products of revolutions.
The latter resulted from changes in the preconstitutional rules and replaced
one legal regime with another. The U.S. Constitution was, as mentioned, a
revolutionary constitution and replaced the Articles of Confederation
without being organically derived from the Articles.
Rick’s article Constituent Authority is a study of constitutional
changes, revolutionary or not, in a multitude of countries.34 But the
constitutional change that intrigued him as much as the revolutionary one
that produced the U.S. Constitution was the English Revolution of
1688-89, which was illegal under the extant legal regime, but during which
the participants went to great lengths to deny its illegality.35 As Rick puts
it:
Every new regime must conform to critical social and
political values in the population it intends to govern.
Sometimes, however, a core value in such a society is the
value of legality itself. When that is the case we can expect
the kind of paradoxical appeal to legality illustrated by the
Revolution of 1688-89.
In 1688 Britain, the political nation was law-saturated . . . .
How, in such an environment, can one make a revolution?
The answer, as the remarkably successful results of 1688-89
testify, is very carefully. At every point the departures from
law were minimized and disguised. William III, as much as
any of his subjects, understood the necessity for this
approach.36
II. KAY ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Rick belongs to that small but righteous group of scholars who endorse
original intended meaning as the proper quarry of constitutional
interpretation (and, indeed, of legal interpretation more generally). That

33

See Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 1, at 716.
Id.
35
See KAY, GLORIOUS, supra note 1, at I; Kay, William III, supra note 1, at 1645–47.
36
Kay, William III, supra note 1, at 1664.
34
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group includes, to my knowledge, in addition to Rick, Stanley Fish,37
Steven Knapp,38 Walter Benn Michaels,39 Stephen Neale,40 Saikrishna
Prakash,41 Scott Soames,42 and myself.43 (I would add Richard Ekins to the
list were he an American interested in constitutional interpretation, as his
view of statutory interpretation is identical to the view of those listed
above.44)
Original intended meaning (OIM) originalists are a tiny branch of the
much larger camp of constitutional originalists, the rest of whom now call
themselves original public meaning (OPM) originalists. I have written that
there is likely no difference between these groups because the hypothetical
reasonable interpreter at the time the Constitution was promulgated—the
construct used by OPM originalists—would himself be seeking the original
intended meaning.45 Moreover, the problem of aggregating intended
meanings in group authored documents like the Constitution will dog the
OPM originalists to the same extent as it dogs OIM originalists such as
Rick and me.
Rick’s adherence to OIM in constitutional interpretation is
longstanding and well documented.46 Mine in print goes back to 1995.47 I
shall explain my views on interpretation briefly, views that I believe Rick
shares jot and tittle.
I begin with the nature of texts. A text, as I shall be using the term, is a
set of symbols - of any kind - that is meant by its producer - the author(s) to communicate a message to the intended audience. The symbols used can
be marks, sounds, dots and dashes, smoke, flags, pictures - indeed,
anything can be used as symbols capable of conveying messages. And
although we are usually interested in the actual authors of a text, texts
produced by one author can be appropriated by another author to convey
the same or a different message. And one can meaningfully ask what
37

See, e.g., Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 632–33

(2005).
38

See, e.g., Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Not a Matter of Interpretation, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 651, 655 (2005).
39
See, e.g., id.; Walter Benn Michaels, The Fate of the Constitution, 61 TEX. L. REV. 765, 773
(1982).
40
See, e.g., Stephen Neale, Convergentism and the Nature of Law 1, 1, 5 (Mar. 14, 2013)
(unpublished draft).
41
See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 2, at 2.
42
See, e.g., Scott Soames, Toward a Theory of Legal Interpretation, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
231, 241 (2011).
43
See publications listed in note 2.
44
See, e.g., RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 1–2 (2012).
45
Alexander, Goldsworthy, supra note 2, at 8–11.
46
For articles showing Kay’s adherence to OIM in constitutional interpretation, see publications
listed in note 1.
47
Alexander, All or Nothing at All, supra note 2.
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message a text would convey if it had been produced, not by its actual
author, but by some different author.
If there is no author - no person who produced the marks, sounds, etc.
in order to convey a message - then we do not have a text.48 The marks,
sounds, etc. may be a sign of something, much as smoke is a sign of fire, or
geese flying south are a sign that winter is coming.49 Marks that might look
like symbols, when we understand they are not—think of cloud formations
that resemble the letters C-A-T—render certain questions nonsensical that
would make sense were there an author. (Consider: Are the clouds
speaking English or French? Are they referring to all felines or only to
tabby cats?) Even when there is an author and a text, the text may be a sign
of something other than the message conveyed. For example, the text may
be a sign that the author has poor handwriting or can use word processing.
Or its message may be a sign that the author was angry, or agitated, or in
love.
Texts are individuated by the messages that their authors are intending
to convey thereby. That is why the text of the U.S. Constitution in Spanish
can be the same as its text in English, or why its text in one font can be the
same as its text in a different font. Even though those tokens of the text
differ from one another, they are tokens of the same text if the message
they convey is the same.50

48

Alexander & Prakash, supra note 2, at 976; Michaels, supra note 39, at 774.
For a similar point, see Kay, Original Intentions, supra note 1, at 40–41.
50
Id. This point is quite important but always overlooked by those who argue for interpreting a
text differently from its authors’ intended meaning but who also claim that they are not changing the
text— what some call “informal amendment.” They overlook this point because they are misled by the
fact that many words or phrases in a given language can bear more than one meaning in that language.
(In truth, when words or phrases are decoupled from the meanings their authors intended, there is no
limit to the meanings they can bear; any symbol can symbolize anything its author intends.) But when
the text in question is translated into a different language, one in which the authors’ intended meaning
is expressed in words or phrases different from those that express the new meaning, then the translated
text with the new meanings will not be the same as the original text with the authors’ intended
meanings. In other words, if word or phrase X can mean either A or B in conventional English, and the
authors’ meaning A is changed to B, then even though the English text would remain the same (X), its
translation into another language might change the text from Y to Z. So what appears in one language
to be an unamended text will appear in another language to be an amended one. Alexander & Schauer,
supra note 2, at 183–84 n.31. Informal amendment will therefore be shown to have been a formal one
after all. And this is why “interpreting” the text to achieve some value rather than to retrieve authorial
intended meaning is not interpretation but amendment by those without authority to amend. When
Joseph Raz advocates “interpretations” that “improve” a constitution, he is blessing unauthorized
amendments rather than interpretations. JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON
THE THEORY OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 354, 361 (2009). Likewise, when Justice Breyer urges
courts to “interpret” the Constitution to achieve “active liberty,” he is advocating constitutional
amendments by the judiciary. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 21–34 (2005). He is misled by the symbols remaining the same after such an
“interpretation.”
49
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When our interest is in the actual authors of a text and the message that
they intended to convey thereby, we are acting as “originalists.” If we are
unsure of the meaning of some word in the text, then, given that our
interest is in the message that the actual authors intended to convey, we
will consult dictionaries contemporaneous with their authoring, not later
dictionaries. And when their words produce an ambiguity, to resolve it we
will ask about the context in which they were authoring, not about contexts
that post or pre-date their authoring.
The ‘conventional meanings’ of words—what meaning dictionaries
would assign them—are merely the meanings most people at a particular
time, and in a particular locale, would intend to convey by those words.
These meanings are therefore time and place bound and can, and do,
change over time and from place to place. But authors may and often do
employ unconventional meanings. They may use codes, or idiolects, or
malapropisms. If their intended audience understands the code or the
idiolect that they are employing, or recognises the malapropism and its
actual intended referent, then the authors can be successful in conveying
their message to their intended audience. If one is interested in knowing
what message the authors are intending to convey, one will want to know
what code, idiolect, etc. the author is employing.
Authors rely on implicatures and implicitures in conveying their
intended messages. They often mean more, and sometimes less, than they
actually say. “John and Mary are married,” uttered when they are observed
walking together, usually conveys the message that they are married to
each other. “It is an aggravating circumstance to use a gun in the
commission of a crime” usually conveys the message that it is aggravating
when the gun is used as a weapon but not as an item of barter for illegal
drugs.
Turning now from interpretation generally to the interpretation of legal
texts, in whomever the authority to exact legal norms resides - in
constitutional ratifiers, in legislatures, in administrators, in judges - then
when they decide which norms to enact and attempt to communicate those
norms through a written or oral text, the job of the intended audience is to
figure out what norms the authors enacted and intended to communicate. If
the audience chooses legal norms that differ from those which the authors
chose to enact and communicate, the authority of the authors is
undermined. Only originalism is authority preserving. Any departure from
originalism either transfers authority from the authors to someone else—
for example, to judges—or to some mindless process, such as the process
by which the meanings of words change over time, as would occur if
contemporary dictionary meanings rather than the meanings
contemporaneous with authorship were relied on in ‘interpreting’ legal
texts.
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Interpretation of legal texts is an empirical, not a normative, endeavor.
The interpreter wants to know what norm the authorities intended to
communicate through their text. It is often quite difficult to answer the
interpreter’s question. The authorities may have expressed their intended
norm poorly. Or the text may be old or ambiguous, and the context of its
promulgation unclear or unknown. But however difficult interpretation
may be, it is unavoidable if the norms that we are to be governed by are the
norms intended by those with authority to govern us.
Finally, interpretation of legal texts must deal with the fact that some
legal authorities are multi-member bodies and sometimes bicameral
multi-member bodies, and can only enact legal norms with the concurrence
of majorities or super-majorities. What is the intended meaning of a legal
text when the members who voted to enact it did not intend to convey the
same meanings and hence the same norms by it? This is the aggregation
problem. On my view, it cannot be avoided. And when there is no shared
meaning that the requisite number of norm enactors endorse, then the text
they enact is legal gibberish. It is a composite of different intended norms
that cannot be combined into a single norm. Perhaps that unfortunate result
is rare. Perhaps it can be avoided by having those who vote for the text
accept the meaning intended by some person or committee without having
that meaning in mind themselves. I see no way, however, to make the
aggregation problem disappear without at the same time undermining the
authority of those who are supposed to possess it.51
As I read Rick’s copious writings on the topic, he would agree with
everything I have said. It is worth quoting a passage from one of Rick’s
earliest articles on constitutional interpretation:
The Constitution became supreme law as a result of the
regard in which its rules and the process for making those
rules were held at the time of its promulgation—that is as a
consequence of a widely shared political understanding as to
the sources and limits of lawmaking power. Put too simply,
the sequence of the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution was understood to express the will of “the
people” in as clear a way as the institutions and traditions of
that time permitted. And it was a political axiom of that day
that all laws and constitutions were subject to revision or
replacement by the sovereign people. The critical point for
my purposes is that the Constitution as law cannot
51
The preceding discussion is similarly stated and examined further in Alexander, Goldsworthy,
supra note 2, at 5–8. For Professor Kay’s shared view of the aggregation problem, see Richard S. Kay,
American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 35–36 (Larry
Alexander ed., 1998).
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materialize out of the air. We come to regard certain
language as the Constitution because of something about the
way it was uttered. Who can disagree with Walter Benn
Michaels that “[n]o one would even try to interpret the
Constitution if everyone thought it had been put together by a
tribe of monkeys with quills.”
It is my position, therefore, that interpretation of the
Constitution consistently with the intentions of its enactors is
inseparable from a determination to treat the Constitution as
law.52
III. CONNECTING THE PRECONSTITUTIONAL RULE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Some have expressed the theory that in the United States, given
differences in the way Justices of the Supreme Court, other judges and
lawyers, and ordinary people interpret the Constitution, the conclusion to
be drawn is that we lack a single preconstitutional rule. Instead, the reality
is that we have several dueling preconstitutional rules, each recognizing a
somewhat different legal system, and each purporting to be the legal
system of the United States.53
I think this concern is overblown. All federal officials, including
Justices of the Supreme Court, recognize that they owe their official status
to language in the 1789 Constitution and its original intended meaning.
Moreover, officialdom accepts that Supreme Court constitutional decisions
are to be treated within the legal system as if they are correct
interpretations of the Constitution, even if they are otherwise regarded as
misinterpretations.54 Finally, no justice or judge to my knowledge has ever
asserted that he or she is not bound to adhere to the 1789 Constitution and
its formal amendments, at least in the absence of a Supreme Court
precedent that is viewed as erroneous but has yet to be overruled by the
Court.55
The source of the worry that we have a multitude of competing legal
systems stems from assuming differing approaches to interpretation of the
Constitution—originalism, textualism, and non-originalist, non-textualist
approaches of varying types—are not just correct and incorrect ways to
interpret the Constitution. For what is the Constitution to which everyone,
52
Kay, Original Intentions, supra note 1, at 45 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Michaels, supra note
39, at 774).
53
See Adler, Interpretive Contestation, supra note 18, at 1119; Adler, Popular Constitutionalism,
supra note 18, at 719–20.
54
See Alexander, Who is Fred?, supra note 2, at 326 n.17.
55
See, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2359 (2015).
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originalists and others, swears fealty? It cannot be the parchment in the
National Archives, with its various markings. Take away its authors and
the meanings they intended to convey, and that piece of parchment and its
markings could mean anything or nothing at all. For suppose we
discovered it was produced by “monkeys with quills,”56 or a wind-caused
ink spill. We would not anguish over the meaning of the marks because
they would have no meaning. Mere marks cannot declare that they are a
language, much less what language they are. We know the marks on the
parchment are English, and American English of the late eighteenth
century rather than modern English, Australian English, South African
English, a special subculture’s dialect, or a Russian code masking as
English. We know this because we know who its authors are and what they
were about in producing this piece of parchment. But ignore their intended
meanings, and that piece of parchment and its markings could mean
anything or nothing.
That is why Rick and I believe originalism of the intended meaning
variety is the only game in town if one purports to be interpreting the
Constitution—that is, the Constitution to which everyone, high or low,
claims to swear allegiance. Our situation is not one where we have
different competing constitutions recognized by different preconstitutional
rules. Rather, we have a single preconstitutional rule that recognizes the
Constitution of 1789 as fundamental law but simultaneously massive
confusion about the implications for interpretation of that recognition. For
the Constitution of 1789 is nothing other than its authors’ intended
meanings—meanings that will remain the same no matter the language in
which they are expressed.
I have argued that the courts do regard the Constitution of 1789 and its
formal amendments as fundamental law; that is their preconstitutional rule,
and decisions that give the opposite impression are the product of judicial
confusion regarding what it means to interpret the Constitution faithfully.
But beyond officialdom, those whom Hart believed counted for identifying
the rule of recognition, what does society at large believe is the
preconstitutional rule? Of course, ordinary people—and even most judges
and lawyers—don’t think about law in such terms. But Hart
notwithstanding, the views of the people—the ruled—should count, at least
if the officials of interest to Hart are to be regarded as legitimate and not
just a gang imposing its will by force, whatever their internal point of view
of their own rules’ legitimacy.
I would hazard a guess that the vast majority of people assent to the
courts’ constitutional decisions, not because they like all the results, but
because they believe the justices and judges are attempting in good faith to
56
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apply the Constitution—the Constitution of 1789 and its formal
amendments—and that, were they aware that the justices and judges were
not doing this, but were instead making up rules and falsely declaring that
these were based on the Constitution of 1789, the courts would lose their
legitimacy in the eyes of the public.57
And why, finally, should we follow the intended meanings of
imperfect and unrepresentative persons from a time far different in many
respects from our own? Surely, the Constitution they bequeathed us is
defective in all sorts of ways.58 So why follow it?
The answer has to be that, whatever its imperfections, the Constitution
of 1789 is preferable to the alternatives. It settles matters that must be
settled, and there is no alternative constitution around which we can all
rally. There is no prospect of a bloodless coup in which the
preconstitutional rule that recognizes the Constitution of 1789 is replaced
by a different preconstitutional rule recognizing some other constitution or
juristocracy.
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See Alexander, Constitutional Theories, supra note 2, at 641–43.
See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 11 (2006).
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